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The fairly standard account of the connectives and and or treats them as standing
for the boolean meet and join operations, respectively, in the appropriate denota-
tion spaces (Keenan and Faltz 1978, 1985; Gazdar 1980; Partee and Rooth 1983).
According to this view, the set of possible denotations of each conjoinable category
is equipped with the structure of a boolean algebra, and a phrase of the form [A
and B], where A and B are expressions of a common conjoinable category, denotes
the boolean meet of the denotations of A and B, and similarly, [A or B] denotes
the boolean join of the denotatitons of A and B. Although it is clear that this
approach cannot cover such uses of and as in group-denoting conjoined NPs (there
are no corresponding uses of or), it seems to have been viewed as successful and
unproblematic for other cases.
Now this approach makes a certain interesting prediction. Take a context
U _V , where the underlined position is to be occupied by a phrase of some fixed
conjoinable category (VP, NP, PP, etc.), such that if A is an expression of that
category, U A V makes up a declarative sentence. Suppose that this context allows
elimination of conjunction, that is, an inference of the following form is valid:
(1) U jA and 13] V
U A V
Given the above treatment of and and or and assuming compositional seman-
tics, it follows that the same context supports another principle, introduction of
disjunction:
(2) U A V
U [A or 13] V
The reason is this. An instance of the schema (1) is
(3) U [[A or B] and A] V
U [A or 13] V
But the denotations of [[A or B] and A] and A must coincide, since (x V y) A
x = x is one of the laws of boolean algebra (indeed of any lattice). 1 Since, by
the compositionality assumption, the semantic value of U X V is functionally
determined by the semantic value of X , the semantic value of U [[A or B] and A]
113
V must also coincide with that of U A V. Then (3) becomes the same principle
as (2).
This is a necessary consequence of the boolean account of the two connectives
(plus compositionality). The boolean account predicts that there is no context of
the form U	 such that (1) is a valid form of inference and (2) is not.2
Now it turns out that there are a few constructions that seem to be counterex-
amples to this prediction. Consider the following inferences:
(4) a.	 John must write a paper and take an exam
John must write a paper
b.	 John must write a paper
John must write a paper or take an exam
John may take an apple and take a pear
(5) a.
John may take an apple
John may take an apple
b.
John may take an apple or take a pear
In both cases, our intuition is that (a) is a perfectly valid inference. Indeed, we are
inclined to assert with confidence that the following are valid forms of inference:
(4) a'.	 C must A and B
C must A
(5) a'.	 C may A and B
C may A
where C is a proper name and A and B are any verb phrases of the appropriate
sort. On the other hand, we strongly feel that there is something wrong with the
(b) inferences. This intuition can be reinforced by considering the following:
(4) c.	 John must write a paper or take an exam
John may take an exam
(5) c.	 John_may take an apple or take a pear
John may take a pear
These inferences are felt intuitively to be valid. However, combining these with
the (b) inferences above, we get
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(4) d.	 John must write a paper
John may take an exam
(5) d.	 John may take an apple
John may take a pear
which are utterly absurd. Thus, we cannot accept the (b) inferences as valid.3
We have seen that the contexts John must_ and John may_ seem to con-
stitute counterexamples to a certain prediction of the boolean account of the con-
nectives and and or, namely, that validity of elimination of conjunction implies
validity of introduction of disjunction. These contexts have been traditional puz-
zles in deontic logic. The problem associated with must is called the Ross paradox
and that associated with may is called the Paradox of the Free Choice Permission
(Ross 1941; von Wright 1968).4
Insofar as these puzzles are genuine, they show an inadequacy of the standard
semantics of and and or. We will, beginning next section, look at some proposed
solutions to these deontic paradoxes, but, before doing so, a couple of remarks
about these contexts involving must and may are in order.
First, it should be immediatley noted that sentences of the form C must/may
[A and/or B] can have multiple readings. Since each of must/may and and/or has
its own scope, there are (at least) two scope possibilities for such sentences: one
possibility has must/may scoping over and/or, and the other has and/or scoping
over must/may. In the case of or, it seems obvious that these different scopings
give rise to different truth conditions. In the following, or takes wide scope with
respect to must/may:
(6) John must write a paper or take an exam, but I don't know which.
(7) John may take an apple or take a pear, but I don't know which.
The first part of these sentences seem to be equivalent to the following, respectively:
(8) Either John must write a paper or he must take an exam.
(9) Either John may take an apple or he may take a pear.
The next examples are different:
(10) John must write a paper or take an exam, but the choice is up to him.
(11) John may take an apple or take a pear; he can take whichever he likes.
It is clear that John must write a paper or take an exam has different truth con-
ditions in (6) and (10). In fact, John must write a paper or take an exam, read in
the way of (6), seems to be almost inconsistent with (10), although (10) itself is of
course perfectly consistent. Similarly, as for (7) and (11), John may not take a pear
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seems to be consistent with John may take an apple or take a pear if the latter is
read in the way of (7), but not if it is read in the way of (11). It must be made
clear that the reading we are interested in is not the wide scope reading found in
(6) and (7), but rather the reading found in (10) and (11). Indeed, (4b) and (5b)
are perfectly valid if it is interpreted in such a way that or takes wide scope. In
the case of and, the difference in truth conditions between different scope possi-
bilities in the context of C must/may_ is harder to discern,5
 but nonetheless it
must be borne in mind that multiple scope possibilities exist and that we are only
interested in the reading where and takes narrow scope with respect to must and
may, when we consider inferences of the form (4a') and (5a').
Secondly, it should be emphasized that the two 'paradoxes' are related, in-
volving the dual notions of obligation and permission, but they are not exactly
parallel, despite the fact that some people have viewed them as one and the same
phenomenon (cf. section 4). In the case of may, what appears to be narrow scope
disjunction seems to be equivalent to wide scope conjunction:
(12)	 C may A and B b C may A and C may B,
where C is a proper name, but this does not hold if may is replaced by must.
(Note the asymmetry between (4c) and (5c).) In fact, in the case of may (but not
in the case of must), the same kind of problem arises in the 'reverse' direction as
well. If it is true that inference of the form (13) is valid, then it must be the case
that inference of the form (14) is also valid, under the boolean account:
C may A or B
C may A
C may A
C may A and B
Now we turn to some of the solutions to these deontic paradoxes proposed so
far in the literature. These solutions are all in a sense inadequate in that they
consider only a few contexts other than those involoving deontic notions like must
and may. We will see below (sections 4 and 5) that the problem is more general
and arises in a variety of contexts.
1.
There have been attempts to explain away the paradoxes in terms of Grice's theory
of conversational implicature (e.g. Hare 1967). Roughly, the explanation goes as
follows.6 Must and may do allow introduction of disjunction. The (b) inferences in
(4) and (5) are really valid, despite our first reactions to them. (4c) and (5c) are not
genuine entailments, but rather instances of Gricean conversational implicature.
Indeed, the implicature does not always arise:
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(15) John must buy an apple or buy a pear, but he must choose the cheaper
one.
(16) John may take an apple or take a pear, but he may not take the more
expnensive one.
We cannot conclude from (16) that John may take a pear, since it might be more
expensive than an apple. The reading of John may take an apple or take a pear
in (16) is not the wide scope reading, since (16) says that John is allowed to take
whichever turns out to be the cheaper of an apple and a pear. A similar thing
can be said about (15). If this shows that the implications in (4c) and (5c) can be
defeasible and therefore are just conversational implicatures, (4b) and (5b) need
not lead to such absurdities as (4d) and (5d), and hence are innocuous. (But see
footnote 3.)
A problem with this accont is that the conversational principle alone cannot
explain why the implications in (4c) and (5c) are more strongly felt than in other
cases where similar conversational implicatures arguably arise. In fact, the may of
possibility also seems to create a similar implicature:
(17) John may be working in his office or playing tennis outside
John may be playing tennis outside
However, the following inference, unlike (5b), does not have a paradoxical flavor
and is felt to be valid:
(18) John may be working in his office
John may be working in his office or playing tennis outside
The conversational principle cannot account for the difference in this respect be-
tween the may of permission and the may of possibility (Hintikka 1979, see section
3 below).
Another problem with the conversational account is pointed out by Kamp
(19'78). The strong semantic force of you may take an apple or take a pear (it is
stronger than you may take an apple or you may take a pear in the sense that it
implies them) does not disappear when it gets embedded in a larger sentence:
(19) Usually you may only take an apple. So if you may take an apple or take
a pear, you should bloody well be pleased. (Kamp 1978, p. 279.)
This discourse only makes sense when you may take an apple or take a pear in
the second sentence is read in the strong sense which implies you may take a pear.
In fact, if it is really the case that you may take an apple entails you may take
an apple or take a pear, as the conversational implicature account holds, and if
we assume that indcative conditionals like the one in (19) support the principle
of strengthening of the antecedent, then the second sentence of (19) should entail
if you may take an apple, you should bloodly well be pleased, which contradicts
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what (19) presupposes. The conversational account is unable to explain why we
understand (19) in the way we do. Since you may take an apple or take a pear is
not asserted in (19), and hence does not inform the addresse of his or her actual
permissible actions, an account which makes use of the information it conveys
cannot be straightforwardly applied to a case like this. A similar example can be
constructed for must as well:
(20)	 If John must write a paper or take an exam, he will probably choose to
take an exam.
(20) makes sense only if John must write a paper or take an exam is meant to
imply John may take an exam.7
Overall, Hintikka (1979) seems to be right in claiming that the conversational
implicature may in fact contribute to the paradoxes, but is certainly 'not the whole
story' (p. 336).
2.
Hilpinen (1982), building on Kamp (1973), emphasizes the ambiguity of 'disjunc-
tive permission sentences' like John may take an apple or take a pear.8 Besides
the wide scope reading, disjunctive permission sentences can have two readings.9
On one reading, it is equivalent to John may take an apple and John may take a
pear, and is stronger than John may take an apple (free choice permission). On
the other reading, it is weaker than John may take an apple and indeed implied
by it (weak permission). The free choice permission reading is illustrated by (11),
and the weak permission reading is the one found in (16). He represents the two
readings by the following formulae:
(21) a.	 may(F(John take an apple) V F(John take a pear))
b.	 may F(John take an aplple V John take a pear)
(a) is the free choice permission reading and (b) is the weak permission reading.
F is what Kamp (1973) called the 'focus operator'. Its function is "to 'move' the
sub-formula which stands within its scope into focus and thereby subject it (as
a whole) to the particular semantic-pragmatic operation which is associated with
the mode, or pragmatic function, of the speech act in question" (Kamp 1973, pp.
69-70). Hilpinen gives semantics to his formal language in such a way that may
FA implies may FM V B), but not may(FA V FB).
Hilpinen also emphasizes the similarity between permission sentences and sub-
juntive counterfactual conditionals. C may A or B usually seems to imply C may
A, but in spite of what this fact would imply under the standard treatment of and
and or (this is the 'reverse direction' mentioned at the end of section 0), C may
A does not imply C may A and B. (Let C be a proper name.) Parallel to this,
although if A or B, then C seems to imply if A, then C, you can't generally infer
from if A, then C to if A and B, then C, in the case of conterfactual conditionals
(failure of the principle of strengthening of the antecedent).
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(22) If this match were struck, it would light.
does not imply
(23) If this match were struck and no oxygen were present, it would light.
(an example from Hilpinen 1982). Also, just as in some cases C may A or B fails
to imply C may A, there are cases in which you cannot infer from if A or B, then
C to if A, then C. Compare:
(24) If Spain had fought in World War II on the Axis side or on the Allied
side, she would have fought on the Allied side. (Hilpinen 1982.)
Hilpinen argues that both disjunctive permission sentences and counterfactuals
with disjunctive antecedents are ambiguous, and the scope of the focus operator
is responsible for this ambiguity. In the case of counterfactuals, the focus operator
has a natural language counterpart, namely if. Compare (24) with:
(25) If Spain had fought in World War II on the Axis side or if Spain had
fought on the Allied side, she would have fought on the Axis side.
(Hilpinen 1982.)
One could hold that (24) is true, but (25) is definitely false.
Now Hilipinen can avoid the paradox in the reverse direction in the following
way. Although John may A or B, on one reading, entails John may A, this does
not lead to such an absurdity as John may A entailing John may A and B, because
the relevant reading of a sentence of the first form is represented as may(F(John
A) V F(John B)) and, in particular, John may [[A and B] or A], under this
reading, becomes may(F(John A A John B) V F(John A)), not may F((John A A
John B) V John may A), and hence cannot be equivalent to John may A, the only
representation of which is may F(John A). The case of conditionals is completely
parallel. He does not discuss the Paradox of Free Choice Permission in our orginal
direction, but it can be avoided in a similar way.
Although his treatment of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents looks
quite successful and he offers a plausible explanation to the fact that conterfac-
tuals with conjunctive antecedents are unambiguous unlike counterfactuals with
disjunctive antecedents, his definition of permission in terms of counterfactual con-
ditionals:
(26) may A def if A, then 11°
(I stands for 'immunity to punishment') looks problematic. The logics of permis-
sion sentences and of counterfactuals are not quite parallel. For one thing, permis-
sion sentences allow 'elimination of conjunction', 'but counterfactuals in general
do not allow elimination of conjunction in the antecedent. This fact is totally
neglected in his paper. In order to reduce the logic of permission sentences to
the logic of counterfactuals by the above definition, it must be shown that the
particular form If A, then I of conditionals generally allow elimination of con-
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junction in the antecedent. If I can be possibly false, I can find no simple way
to guarantee this. 11
 If the logic of permission sentences cannot be reduced to the
logic of counterfactuals, then the fact that sentences of the form C may A and
B is unambiguous (in the sense that there is only one truth condition associated
with it) despite the fact that it can be rendered either as may F(CA A CB) or as
may(F(CA) AF(CB)), needs an independent explanation.'
Also, it is not at all clear how Hilpinen's account can be extended to cover the
case of must. Certainly, much more needs to be said to maintain his account as a
solution to all the paradoxes we have looked at.
3.
Hintikka (19'79) offers an ingenious solution to the paradoxes within the framework
of his game-theoretical semantics, which seems to me to be more satisfactory than
other solutions proposed so far. According to Hintikka, the peculiar nature of
sentences like:
(27) John must write a paper or take an exam
and
(28) John may take an apple or take a pear
results from 'the tendency to confuse moves in a semantical game with the choices
of real-life persons'. Let us sketch his solution.
In game-theoretical semantics, the semantic property of a sentence is deter-
mined by reference to the two-person game which is associated with the sentence.
The game is played between players called Myself and Nature according to cer-
tain prescribed rules. The game is considered as my attempt to verify the given
sentence against all the counterexamples which Nature might produce. The game
starts with the given sentence and the actual world and continues until it reaches
an atomic sentence which contains only proper names and simple verbs. This
atomic sentence is either true or false in the world under consideration. If the for-
mer, I win, and if the latter, Nature wins. The sentence is true if I have a winning
strategy that leads me to verify the sentence no matter how Nature makes his
moves, false otherwise. Let us look at how the game proceeds for the paradoxical
sentences which are the focus of this paper. The relevant rules are the following:
(G.phrasal or)	 When the game has reached a sentence of the form
X—Y1 or Y2—Z
where Yi and Y2 are phrases of a cocnjoinable category, then I can choose
(i = 1 or 2) and the game is continued with respect to
X—Yi—Z
and the same world.
(G.may) When the game has reached a world W and a sentence of the form
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a may X,
where 'a' is a proper name, I can choose a world W' which is a deontic
a-alternative to W. The game is continued with respect to W' and X',
where X' is the result of changing the main infinitive in X to third person
singular and prefixing 'a' to it.
(G.must) Similar to above, except that the choice is made by Nature instead of
Myself.
Here is how the game-theoretical semantics of (27) works out. Starting with the
actual world W, Nature will choose a deontic alternative W' to W by (G.must),
and the game is continued with respect to W' and the sentence
(29) John writes a paper or takes an exam.
Now according to (G.phrasal or) I can choose from
(30) John writes a paper
and
(31) John takes an exam
in each such W' so that a true sentence be produced. But 'everybody keenly feels
it to be wrong for me to pretend to make a choice on behalf of another agent,
in this case John, of what he is to do. Hence John's real-life choice is naturally
transmuted into a choice by him in my semantical games.' (Hintikka 1979, p. 334.)
The consequence of this is that since the choice between (30) and (31) is John's,
not mine, John must be permittted to do either. This is what radically changes
the semantics of (27).
In the case of (28), the semantical games associated with it are just like those
associated with (27), except that the choice of the deontic alternative is made by
Myself instead of Nature. But after the choice of the deontic alternative, the same
confusion between John's choice and mine arises. This gives (28) the force of
(32) John may write a paper and he may take an exam.
This solution has several implications. Among other things, it predicts that the
same peculiarity should arise when the sentence involves an existential quantifier
in place of disjunction, since the rule associated with existentials also invlolves a
choice to be made by Myself in much the same way as the rule of disjunction. This
prediction seems to be borne out:
(33) a.	 John must read War and Peace.
b.	 John must read some book (or other).
It seems strange to infer from (33a) to (33b), just like the case of disjunction
(Hintikka 1979, p. 335).
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Another prediction of this solution is that the paradox manifests itself only
when a 'disjunction between options of an agent' is present. Other kinds of disjunc-
tion should not bring about any paradox. According to Hintikka, there is nothing
paradoxical with the following inferences; they are perfectly valid (p. 339):13
(34) John may mail the letter.
Therefore: John or Bill may mail the letter.
(35) This letter may be mailed by John.
Therefore: This letter may be mailed by John or Bill.
Even when different options of an agent are being discussed, the paradox does
not arise if 'we are focusing not on his decisions but impersonally on the different
options open to him.' (36) is felt to imply (37) only if the may is taken to be the
may of possibility (Hintikka 1979, pp. 337-338):
(36) John may come on Tuesday.
(37) John may come on Tuesday or Wednesday.
Although Hintikka does not show how to get the 'weak' sense of sentences like
(27) and (28), it's possible to get the wide scope disjunction reading. If (G.phrasal
or) applies first to (28), it yields either
(38) John may take an apple
Or
(39) John may take a pear.
Since in this case the choice between (38) and (39) is not between different options
open to John, but rather between different permissions that might have been given
to him, the confusion between my choice and John's arguably does not arise.14
4.
Hitikka's solution seems to be more satisfacory than others in that it explains
why the puzzling behavior of and and or arises in the case of the may of permission,
but not in the case of the may of possibility, and it has a clear prediction as to
the range of contexts in which similar puzzles arise: validity of elimination of
conjunction fails to imply validity of introduction of disjunction just in case what
the sentence expresses is somehow related to choices of real-life individuals, and
choices made by the players of the semantical game associated with the sentence
can get confused with such choices of real-life individuals.
However, his solution is not without problems. Firstly, although this is not
necessarily an inadequacy, it should be pointed out that his solution amounts
to denial of both the boolean semantics of or and compositionality. (G.phrasal
or), which corresponds to the usual boolean interpretation, does not apply in
the usual way just in case there has been a previous application of (G.must) or
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(G.may) (or game rules associated with other similar expressions). This means
that the meaning of write a paper or take an exam or take an apple or take a
pear cannot be given independently of the context in which it is embedded. Even
if the failure of compositionality is independently motivated in game-theoretical
semantics, it is not clear whether this particular problem necessitates denial of
both the boolean semanics of or and compositionality. In other words, his solution
might be unnecessarily radical. If compositionality is given up, there must be a
way to avoid the paradoxes without giving up boolean semantics, and if boolean
semantics is to be denied, there must be a compositional semantics that avoids the
paradoxes.
Secondly, it is not obvious that the problem associated with may and that
associated with must are one and the same. As for may, the strong 'free choice
permission' reading has an affinity with the pheomenon that or behaves as wide
scope conjunction in some consturctions:15
(40) John is taller than Bill or Mary.
(41) Either an apple or a pear satisfies John.
(42) The doctor makes house calls in either village A or village B.
These are contexts that naturally allow any:
(43) John is taller than any other student.
(44) Any fruit satisfies John.
(45) The doctor makes house calls in any village within 5 miles.
The may of permission also allows any in its complement:
(46) John may take any fruit.
(47) John may come any day next week.
There is some reason to believe any is basically an existential quantifier, rather
than a universal quantifier:
(48) I wonder if anyone has come.
(48) means "neither 'I wonder if everyone has come' nor 'It is true of everyone
that I wonder if he has come', but rather 'I wonder if someone has come'." (Kamp
1973, p. 69.)
Parallelism between (40), (41), (42), (28), and (37) (the last two repeated
below), on the one hand, and (43), (44), (45), (46), and (47), on the other, is
obvious.16
(28)	 John may take an apple or take a pear.
(37)	 John may come on Tuesday or Wednesday.
Suppose that these contexts can have an effect of somehow 'converting' existential
quantification into wide scope universal quantification. (Any is particularly liable
to undergo this process, while some cannot.) Now given the parallelism between
existential quantification and disjunction, and between universal quantification and
conjunction (existential quantification is a generalized disjunction, and universal
quantification is a generalized conjunciton), it is naturally expected that these
contexts can also convert disjunction into wide scope conjunction.
Must does not create a context of this kind:
(49) John must read any paper in this list.
sounds odd. Compare:
(50) John may skip any paper in this list.
Also, when must is replaced by may in inference like (33), the problem seems to
disappear:
(51) John may read War and Peace.
Therefore: John may read some book (or other).
These considerations suggest the following conclusion: The Paradox of Free
Choice Permission can be viewed as a general pheomenon that disjunction and
existential quantification behave like wide scope conjunction and universal quan-
tification, respectively, in certain contexts in which any naturally occur. 17 Since
some, although an existential quantifier, cannot become a wide scope universal
quantifier even in such contexts, the may–some combination does not give rise to
the paradox. The Ross paradox is quite distinct from this general phenomenon,
since sentences containing must and or do not have wide scope conjunction read-
ings, and the same paradox arises with sentences containing some. Therefore, the
Ross paradox and the Paradox of Free Choice Permission are not one and the same
paradox. Hintikka is mistaken in trying to give a single solution to both.
5.
Thus, I assume that the Paradox of Free Choice Permission can be solved by
applying to disjunction whatever mechanism is needed to account for the wide
scope universal quantificational force of any, and that it has nothing to do with
the particular concept of permission. Intensionality is not essential to this, either,
as can be seen from (40), although it will probably be a contributing factor in
many cases. 18 What exactly is responsible for the behavior of or and any as wide
scope conjunction and universal quantifier, respectively, is an interesting question
itself, but cannot be answered here.' From now on, let us put aside the Paradox
of Free Choice Permission, and concentrate on the Ross paradox and its kin.
A question we should ask ourselves is: Are there any other contexts where and
and or behave puzzlingly just as in the context created by must? In fact, there
are many such:
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(52) a.	 Pierre wants to learn English and study computer science
Pierre wants to learn English
b. Pierre wants to learn English
Pierre wants to learn English or study computer science
c. Pierre wants to learn English or study computer science
Pierre has a desire which will be satisfied
if he studies computer science
(53) a.	 Pierre is trying to learn English and Spanish
Pierre is trying to learn English
b. Pierre is trying to learn English
Pierre is trying to learn English or Spanish
c. Pierre is trying to learn English or Spanish
Pierre is engaging in an attempt which will succeed
if he learns English
(54) a.	 John needs to come on Tuesday and Wednesday
John needs to come on Tuesday
b. John needs to come on Tuesday
John needs to come on Tuesday or Wednesday
c. John needs to come on Tuesday or Wednesday
If John can't come on Tuesday, he needs to come on Wednesday
(55) a.	 John wants a model plane and a video game
John wants a model plane
b. John wants a model plane
John wants a model plane or a video game
c. John wants a model plane or a video game
If John is given a video game, he will be happy
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(56) a.	 John needs a computer and a printer
John needs a computer
b. John needs a computer
John needs a computer or a word processor
c. John needs a computer or a word processor
If John cannot afford to get a computer,
he needs to get a word processor
(57) a.	 John is looking for a unicorn and a centaurs
John is looking for a unicorn
b. John is looking for a unicorn
John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs
c. John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs
John is engaging in a search which will be fulfilled
if he finds a centaurs
(58) a.	 I hope John will catch a unicorn and a centaurs
I hope John will catch a unicorn
b. I hope John will catch a unicorn
I hope John will catch a unicorn or a centaurs
c. I hope John will catch a unicorn or a centaurs
I will be happy if John will catch a centaurs
In all cases above, (a) is a valid form of inference, (b) is an inference which is
hard to accept, and (c) is an intuitively valid inference which leads to an absur-
dity in conjunction with (b). Perhaps there might be a difference in degree of
paradoxicality among these examples.
These are all intensional contexts created by verbs which (with the exception
of need) Asher (1987) called `buletics' or 'conditionally dependent indefinites'.
Not all kinds of intensional contexts are paradoxical (e.g. the may of possibility).
The question is: What exactly is the common feature of these contexts that is
responsible for the paradox? It is obvious that not all of these constructions
involve an agent's 'decision' to choose between different options given to him. For
example, when John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs, whether to find a
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unicorn or a centaurs is not something that he can choose. This reveals another
inadequacy of Hintikka's solution.
It does seem, however, that these contexts have some common semantic feature.
It seems that the notion of fulfillment or satisfaction is associated with all these
contexts. And this fulfillment or satisfaction can be expressed by conditional
sentences. For example, in the case of (52), if Pierre wants to learn English or
study computer science, his desire will be satisfied if he can manage to learn
English or study computer science. In the case of (57), if John is looking for a
unicorn or a centaurs, his search will be fulfilled if he finds a unicorn or a centaurs.2°
Unfortunately, I have no good answer yet to the question why this semantic feature
causes the paradox, and so must leave the question here with these remarks.
6.
I would like to close this paper with some speculation on possible ways to avoid
the Ross paradox. (Let us call the puzzles in (4), (52)–(58) generically 'the Ross
Paradox'.) The paradox depends on the following assumptions (suppose that the
context is U _V):
Al. Elimination of conjunction ((1)) is valid:
U [A and 13] V
U AV
A2. Introduction of disjunction ((2)) is not in general valid:
U A V
U [A or B] V
where the conclusion is read in the 'strong' sense.
A3. U A V and U [[A or B] and A] V are truth-conditionally equivalent.
Al–A3 are sufficient to yield the paradox. Al and A2 are data based on our intu-
ition. A3 is a consequence of the standard boolean account and compositionality.
To avoid the paradox, one must deny at least one of them.
The conversational implicature account was essentially an attempt to deny A2.
We have seen that it faces a considerable difficulty.
Is it possible to deny Al? In fact, Asher (1987) claims that conditionally
dependent verbs do not in general allow elimination of conjunction. The following
is his example:
(59) Fred wants a car and a garage for it. So Fred wants a garage for a car.
`Fred might very well not want a garage unless he gets a car, so the ... inference in
[(59)] doesn't seem valid...' (p. 171). Actually, this is not an instance of elimination
of conjunction, because the first sentence is different from Fred wants a car and
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a garage for a car. Let us slightly modify (59) to make it a genuine instance of
elimination of conjunction:21
(60) Fred wants a car and a garage. So Fred wants a garage.
The same remark should apply to (60). It seems possible to say 'Fred wants a car
and a garage, but he does not want a garage unless he gets a car'. But does this
really show that the inference in (60) is invalid? Consider:
(61) Fred wants a garage, but he doesn't want one unless he gets a car.
(62) Fred doesn't want a garage, but he wants a car and a garage.
(62) sounds to me like a downright contradiction. On the other hand, (61) seems
to me to be something that we could say. If so, the mere fact that you can say 'Fred
wants a car and a garage, but he doesn't want a garage unless he gets a car' does
not show that Fred wants a car and a garage fails to entail Fred wants a garage.22
Certainly, it is not an easy task to produce counterexamples to elimination of
conjunction for all kinds of contexts that apparently give rise to the Ross paradox.23
It shoud be noted that the derivation of the paradox does not in fact depend on
the fact that elimination of conjunction hold in full generality. What is relevant
for the derivation of the parpdox is the following special case of elimination of
conjunction (=(3)):
A1'.	 The following special form of elimination of conjunction is valid:
U [[A or B] and A] V
U [A or B] V
where the conclusion is read in the 'strong' sense.
For example, to derive (57b), it is only required that the following instance of
elimination of conjunction is valid:
(63) John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs and a unicorn
John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs
Here, the conclusion John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs must be under-
stood in the strong sense that finding a unicorn and finding a centaurs would both
satisfy John. We may have no robust intuition about a sentence like the assump-
tion in (63), but it seems that this particular instance, at least, is not immediately
objectionable.
The remaining assumption is A3. A3 is a consequence of the standard treat-
ment, but what about our intuition about its validity? Take, for exmaple, John is
looking for a unicorn or a centaurs and a unicorn. Is it synonymous with John is
looking for a unicorn? It seems not. If John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs
and a unicorn, John must find either two unicorns or a unicorn and a centaurs
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in order to achieve his goal. Then John is looking for a unicorn or a centaurs
and a unicorn cannot mean the same as John is looking for a unicorn. But this
is probably because of the indefiniteness of the second occurrence of a unicorn.
The Ross paradox does not depend on the presence of an indefinite. Take, for a
second example, Pierre wants to learn English or study computer science and learn
English. Unfortunately, it seems that we have no clear intution about a case like
this
There are various possible ways to avoid A3. One could deny the sameness
of meaning between [[A or B] and A] and A by denying the boolean semantics
of and and or,24 or by invoking something like a structured meaning as their
`hyperintension's Or one could argue that the surface syntax of U [[A or B] and
A] V is concealing its real 'logical form', by, for example, positing some 'invisible'
operator like Kamp-Hilpinen's focus operator. Or one could deny the principle of
compositionality and say that although the meanings of [[A or B] and A] and A
are one and the same, the difference in their internal structure causes U [[A or B]
and A] V and U A V to have different meanings (which is equivalent to invoking
structured meanings).
Much more work would be needed to diagnose the problem correctly and pro-
pose a reasonable treatment, but I must stop here with this incomplete discussion.25
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NOTES
1 Thus, the present argument would go through even if the logic of and and or were weaker
than classical logic, like intuitionistic logic.
2 Similarly, validity of (2) implies validity of (1) under the boolean account. In this sense,
(1) and (2) are equivalent.
3 Some people might find reason to object to (4c) and/or (5c). It seems to me, however,
that our intuition about the invalidity of (4b) and (5b) do not necessarily depend on
acceptance of the validity of (4c) and (5c).
4 But the way the puzzles are formulated here is not necessarily the same as in the earlier
literature in deontic logic. For example, we are not treating must and may as sentential
opertaors.
5 One could perhaps argue that while a person who may A and B (where and takes narrow
scope) are entitled to do both of A and B, a person who may A and may B might possibly
be disallowed to do both, but the intuition is not very clear. I can think of no good reason
not to regard C must A and B and C must A and C must B as always truth-conditionally
equivalent. But see section 5 below.
6 The following account does not follow Hare (1967) or any others.
7 But this might not necessarily constitute a knockdown argument for the conversational
account. Consider:
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(i) If John may be working in his office or playing tennis outside, you should check the
tennis court first.
This makes sense only if John may be working in his office or playing tennis outseide
implies John may be playing tennis outside. Thus, the same kind of phenomenon also
occurs in cases which the conversational account is supposed to be able to handle. Then,
the notion of conversational implicature should perhaps be adapted to account for cases
like this where the sentence in question does not lose its usual implicature when it is
embedded in a larger sentence and is not itself asserted.
8 Hilpinen only discusses permission sentences, not sentences containing must.
9 Hilpinen does not mention the wide scope reading. I simply assume that his 'weak
permission' reading is distinct from the wide scope reading.
1 ° The free choice permission reading is defined as (If A) V (If B), then I.
11 For example, if we take a necessarily true proposition as A and a necessarily false
proposition as B, and suppose that I is false in a given world, then it should be the
case that If A and B, then I is true and If A, then I is false. Hilpinen suggests that
the conditional in the definition (19) might not be an 'ordinary conditional', but a special
deontic conditional. However, as long as it is given a kind of Lewis type semantics, it is not
clear how it could possibly guarantee the possibility of allowing elimination of conjunction
in the antecedent.
12 But see footnote 5. Consider the following dialogue due to Stanley Peters:
A. May I take this $100,000?
B. No.
A. May I take this $100,000 and deposit it in the bank?
B. Yes.
Does this show that permission sentences can sometimes fail to allow elimination of con-
junciton? Many things can be said about this example. On hearing B's second reply, A
can then say:
A. So I may take this $100,000.
B. You're right.
Does B contradict himself when he makes his third reply? Or, his third reply is actually
consistent with his first reply because the context of A's final utterance is different from
that of A's first question and thus B denies and affirms two different propositions? If the
latter view is right, then isn't the context of A's second question also different from that
of his first question? Can this example show that A may B and C and A may not B can
be consistent in some context, despite the fact that it seems to be always contradictory to
say A may B and C, but A may not B?
13 This assertion might be questionable. If may is replaced by must, it becomes obvious
that the inference does not go through (on one reading):
John must mail the letter.
Therefore: (Either) John or Bill must mail the letter.
This is a problem for Hintikka's account, in addition to those discussed in the next section.
14 But Kamp (1978) notes that 'You may take an apple or you may take a pear' can be
read with the same strong sense as (28), although it sounds less natural read in this way.
15 These constructions should be distinguished from those cases where it is merely the
case that narrow scope disjunction is equivalent to wide scope disjunction:
(i)	 If I find an apple or a pear, I will take it.
16 This kind of parallelism is noted by Kamp (1973): "[In] most statements containing 'or'
which have natual counterparts with 'any', the 'or' can be regarded as having the force of
`and'." (p. 69.)
17 It seems that this phenomenon is either lacking or far less general in Japanese. The
literal, word-to-word translation of (40) does not mean what the English sentence means;
it only means 'John is taller than Bill or John is taller than Mary'. Correspondingly, the
translation of (28) into Japanese does not seem to have the strong free choice permission
reading, at least not as readily as in English.
is The can of 'ability' is another intensional context that gives rise to wide scope conjunc-
tion reading of or:
(i) I can drop you at the next corner or drive you to the bus stop. (Kamp 1978, p. 281.)
19 Some kind of 'focus' might well be relevant.
20 Asher (1987) claims that buletics have the logic of would be happy if, and need has
the logic of would be happy only if . His characterization does not seem to me to be quite
accurate.
21 Actually, what Asher denies is the inference he calls 'simplification', of which elimination
of conjunction is a proper subcase, so his example is not itself inadequate for his purposes.





Alexis hopes that she will have chicken or fish for dinner. (With either she will be
equally happy.) So she hopes that she will have chicken for dinner.
(Asher 1987, p. 172.)
23 Kamp (1973) considers a similar example with ought (I assume that ought shows an
inference pattern similar to must.) He says that 0(p A q) --÷ Op is not valid, "if we read 0
as 'it ought to be the case that', and understand 'ought' as 'ought, no matter what'. For it
could be the case that independently of whatever else may happen the realization of both p
and q would bring about a better state of affairs than would ensue if the conjunction were
not realized, while the realization of p in the absence of q would mean disaster. Perhaps
the man standing under the first floor window of the burnng house ought, no matter what,
to tell the frightened girl behind it to jump, and catch her in his arms when she does. But
if he cannot catch her, or doesn't want to risk his bones, he certainly ought not to tell her
to jump." (pp. 59-60.)
24 We could perhaps try to generalize the semantics of group-denoting conjoined NPs to
all conjoinable categories. For example, under this approach, conjoined sentences would
stand for 'plural' propositions or groups of propositions, and conjoined VPs would stand
for groups of properties.
25 One thing I have left out in this paper is examining inferences like the following, which
should follow from the validity of elimination of conjunction under the standard account
with a reasonable assumption about the semantics of a certain class of adverbs:
(i)
	
John must speak slowly
John must speak
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